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Abstract
Dominant investors can influence the publicly available information about firms by affect-
ing the cost of information collection. Under strategic competition, transparency results
in higher variability of profits and output. Thus, lenders prefer less transparency, since
this protects firms when in a weak competitive position, while equity holders prefer more.
Market interaction creates strategic complementarity in gathering information on com-
peting firms, thus entry by transparent competitors will improve price informativeness.
Moreover, as the return to information gathering increases with liquidity, increasing global
trading may undermine the ability of bank control to keep firms opaque.
I. Introduction
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate on the convergence of corporate
governance structures across countries. A central difference usually identified
among governance systems is the relative degree of influence of equity market
investors vs. other institutions, which may be large lenders (banks) or large inside
equity holders (usually family-controlled holding companies). Yet, while there
are sharply different views on their comparative efficiency, there is to date little
theoretical work on the process of competing vs. converging governance forms.
The literature on legal origin has taken the view that the structure of financial
systems is defined by historical legal tradition and therefore is nearly immutable
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), (1998)). This view has
been challenged by other authors who argue that financing and governance sys-
tems change over time, responding to the evolution of domestic political circum-
stances (Rajan and Zingales (2001), Biais and Perotti (2002)). In the legal litera-
ture, some authors see convergence to the Anglo-Saxon model as a near certainty
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(Hansmann and Kraakman (2003)). Others (Bebchuk and Roe (1999)) have sug-
gested that path dependence will persist, leaving national systems of governance
pursuing parallel paths. Finally, many authors see competition in legislation as a
powerful tool for convergence (Easterbrook and Fischel (1991)).
Much attention has been dedicated to comparative information efficiency of
shareholder control over delegated monitoring by lenders. 1 On the one hand, Di-
amond (1984) has argued that information gathering may be best delegated to
intermediaries to avoid duplicating efforts. On the other hand, others have em-
phasized the importance of decentralized market trading to support information
collection (see, e.g., Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993)). Both approaches capture cer-
tainly an important, but ultimately static, difference between different institutional
settings.
This paper investigates the consequences of different governance structures
on the diffusion of information. We treat the allocation of investors’ influence on
the firm as exogenously determined. To focus on the institutional structure, we
define a firm as debt or equity dominated depending on which investor is dominant
in terms of governance, not on the amount of capital supplied.
It is a common perception that bank-dominated firms are more opaque (see
e.g., Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995)).2 However, even for firms with little re-
course to the public capital market, public information matters since it has strate-
gic effects in a context of imperfect competition (Bhattacharya and Ritter (1982),
Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein (1988), and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000)).
Therefore, it is important to understand the incentives not only of firms, but also
of investors to achieve transparency.
It is not always obvious how firms can credibly disclose private information,
since ex post they may prefer to hide unfavorable news. This paper argues there-
fore that a credible mechanism for the commitment to disclose must be set up in
advance, and shows that this choice depends on the preferences of the dominant
investor. Specifically, we endogenize the corporate decision to encourage an inde-
pendent (and thus reliable) process of information dissemination via information
gathering and trading of corporate securities by active investors. For instance, ex
post transparency may be ensured by an ex ante decision to list (or cross-list) on
a market with tight disclosure or active investors.
Most of the early literature on disclosure focuses on the incentive to reveal
once a firm has acquired some private information (Stoughton, Wong, and Zech-
ner (2001), Yosha (1995), and Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein (1988)). In
contrast, we study the long-term transparency choice, a structural decision before
private information is known. We argue that companies are transparent not be-
cause of their direct disclosures (which may be ex post unreliable), 3 but because
1Arguably, a limitation of the theoretical literature has been its emphasis on normative modeling.
A more recent approach studies the political foundations of governance structure (Pagano and Volpin
(2000), Perotti and von Thadden (2002)).
2For recent evidence of greater opaqueness of banks’ assets, see Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran
(1997).
3The incentives to disclose once a firm has acquired some private information are well understood.
Firms with good news prefer more or less disclosure depending on the nature of their private infor-
mation. When it concerns their own strength, firms with good news prefer disclosure. When news
concerns the profitability of the market, and competitors may choose to enter, firms with better news
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they have put in place structures that allow market participants to gather infor-
mation and to communicate this information indirectly via market prices. Yet,
dominant investors can affect the overall accessibility of corporate information
by influencing the cost of acquiring information about the firm.
In our model, companies engage in product market competition after en-
dogenous information revelation via market trading. Since under imperfect com-
petition more opaque firms will exhibit less variability in profits relative to more
transparent firms, lenders prefer less transparency.
The economic intuition is as follows. Less transparent firms reveal less to
competitors on their competitive strength; thus, ex post they may create either a
strategic advantage or disadvantage. When firms act on the basis of less informa-
tion, their expectation of competitors’ output is either too high or too low. This
hurts firms that are strong, as it leads competitors to be more aggressive, but it
protects weak firms, which can better protect their market share and profitability.
As a result, under lack of transparency expected profits are lower, but the volatility
of profits and output are lower as well.4
Reduced volatility (and in particular the higher profitability in the lower
states) increases the return to holders of fixed claims on the firm. This implies
that there is a natural preference by lenders for less ex post information dissemi-
nation, as they do not gain from higher profits but suffer from higher risk (Jensen
and Meckling (1976)).
We show that lender-dominated firms will discourage informative prices, as
this would endogenously undermine the value of their claims. In contrast, firms
dominated by shareholders encourage greater informativeness of prices, as infor-
mation dissemination on average increases profitability as well as risk. Compe-
tition among firms with different dominant investors does not alter their trans-
parency choice, although a lender’s claim enjoys less protection from less public
information if its borrower faces a transparent competitor.
There are of course other reasons for banks to wish to limit information
diffusion. A natural example arises when lenders have superior information on
their clients’ credit quality, and are therefore able to charge high information rents
(Rajan (1992)). Similar incentives exist also in the case of firms controlled by
large shareholders who wish to maintain opaque operations in order to capture
some private benefits of control.
Our market microstructure model of information gathering allows us to study
the ability to sustain a chosen degree of transparency as external circumstances
evolve. An interesting result of the analysis is that there may be interactive effects
of information acquisition, leading to multiple equilibria. In particular, we show
that information revelation in two markets can be strategically complementary. If
this is the case, investors have an incentive to acquire information on one firm
only if other investors choose to acquire information on its competitors. As far
as we know, this is the first paper to investigate complementarities in information
prefer less disclosure (and thus private, bilateral financing, as in Yosha (1995), or Gertner, Gibbons,
and Scharfstein (1988)).
4These results are quite robust and hold for the case of Cournot as well as Bertrand competition
regardless of whether products are strategic complements or substitutes. For an excellent survey of
this general result, see Ku¨hn and Vives (1994).
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generation on competing firms. Here the information revealed by the stock market
affects product market competition, thus affecting the return to gather information
on competitor firms.
A remarkable implication of this effect is that the ability of dominant in-
vestors to limit information dissemination may be undermined by choices made
by other firms. A switch of competitor firms toward shareholder value (i.e., to
equity control), may have a strong impact on the whole system, because of the
complementarity in information production. In some cases, once a firm becomes
transparent, informed trading could become profitable also for its bank-controlled
competitor. Hence, an exogenous policy change of one group of firms affects the
transparency of all firms in equilibrium.
In addition, changing circumstances on the capital market may have the same
self-reinforcing effect. For instance, changes in liquidity on the security markets
increase the return to information gathering and may lead to more information
dissemination, even if the dominant investors seek to limit transparency. This will
have an impact on product market competition, the return to gathering information
on competing firms, and may thus increase the degree of transparency for other
firms as well.
If increasing financial integration leads to greater information revelation
through a higher return to information gathering, lenders will less actively dis-
courage the acquisition of information by investors. Moreover, the increasing
competition resulting from the greater informativeness of prices tends to raise the
riskiness of their claims. Ultimately, this process may reduce the attractiveness
of corporate control by banks, and encourage a progressive withdrawal of their
influence. In particular, the increase in the riskiness of corporate profits may in-
crease the role of equity, given its comparative advantage in absorbing exogenous
risk.
The paper offers also some indication on the effect of an increase in the de-
gree of competition on the product market on transparency. The effect on the
evolution of transparency depends very much on the nature of the change in com-
petition. If competition increases in the sense that the products become closer
substitutes, the fall in overall profit margins would reduce price variability and
thus the incentive to gather information. Of course, information costs may also
be reduced by increasing integration and competition. On the other hand, if the
increase in competition arises from entry by new firms with more transparent
choices, such as firms from other countries, then the result is opposite: comple-
mentarity in information gathering will lead to greater transparency for other firms
as well, potentially creating a domino effect for the whole industry. A final con-
sideration is that the effect of greater transparency tends to enhance the intensity
of product market competition and create a greater wedge between the strong and
weaker firms than under more opaque capital markets.
We believe that such results can describe the impact of financial integration
in many markets traditionally dominated by banks, such as in continental Europe
or in Japan. Entry of new investors and new competitors has put pressure on com-
panies to adopt a more open form of communication with investors. This is widely
interpreted as leading to an increasing convergence in financial systems toward an
Anglo-Saxon, market-oriented financial system. We thus argue that a cause for
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this change may be the changes in trading intensity and liquidity brought about by
the inflow of stock market capital into European and Japanese markets. We then
show that due to the informational complementarity, any change in investor ac-
tivity toward more information acquisition may produce a self-reinforcing move-
ment toward industry-wide information revelation.
While there has been to date little specific empirical analysis, there is some
evidence that Japanese companies with influential main banks tend to be less prof-
itable than more independent companies (Caves and Uekusa (1976), Weinstein
and Yafeh (1998)). More specifically, these firms appear to have less variability in
profitability and grow comparatively less than independent companies (Nakatani
(1984)). They also tend to be less liquidity constrained (Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1991)), which is consistent with the model’s suggestion that produc-
tion is more supported in less profitable states under bank funding. All these facts
are consistent with our results that less transparent firms competing with more
transparent rivals ought to have lower average output and profits and less volatile
earnings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II sets out the
model. In Sections III–V, we analyze in turn product market competition, finan-
cial market activity, and investor choices to solve the model. At the end of Section
V, we single out the more interesting comparative statics concerning changes in
corporate governance. Section VI concludes. Several lengthy formulas and their
derivations are contained in the appendix that is available from the authors or the
JFQA Web site (www.jfqa.org).
II. The Model
A. Timing and Product Market Interaction
The model is a dynamic game with five stages. In stage 1, the dominant
investors in each firm determine the degree of ex ante transparency of the firm.
In stage 2, firms receive some private information about their own quality (which
we often refer to as their type). In stage 3, some agents in the stock market can
choose to become informed about firm quality at some cost. In stage 4, there is
trading in the firms’ stocks, which may or may not reveal information. Finally,
in stage 5, the two firms, after observing stock market prices, compete in the
product market. Then customers make their purchase, and profits are realized and
distributed to investors.
We consider two firms who compete in the product market. The firms pro-
duce differentiated products and act as Cournot competitors. Firms have either
a high or a low quality product, which affects the relative attractiveness of their
own product vis-a`-vis their competitor’s. Quality is described by a parameter  i
which can take two values. When the product is of high quality,  i = H, while
i = L otherwise, with H > L. Product quality is uncertain. Ex ante, either firm
has a prior probability q of having a high quality product. The probability of high
quality is common to both firms and commonly known. Once output is realized,
customers base their purchase on actual quality.
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The inverse demand function faced by firm i is given by
Pi = i   Qi   Qj;(1)
where i=1; 2; j== i, and 1    1.  can be interpreted as the degree of substi-
tutability between the firms’ products and describes the intensity of competition
in the market. If  > 0, the two goods are strategic substitutes under Cournot
competition. If  < 0, the goods are strategic complements. 5 To simplify the
exposition, we will concentrate on the case   0. All our main results hold, with
minor changes to some formulas, for arbitrary .
To focus on the impact of transparency on competition, we assume that pro-
ductivity is constant across firms and that marginal costs for each firm are constant
and normalized to zero. We assume throughout that the production decision of the
firm is taken by managers who maximize profits, i.e., investors do not influence Q i
directly. This is in contrast to Brander and Lewis (1986), who analyze the impact
of capital structure on product market competition. They show that if the firm has
risky debt, equity investors have an incentive to boost output to take advantage of
limited liability. Since this effect is not well documented empirically, we choose
to work under the assumption of profit maximization. 6
B. Capital Structure, Influence, and Information Dissemination
Each firm has a capital structure consisting of debt and equity. To avoid
the trivial cases of non-transparency for privately held firms, we assume that the
firms’ equity is publicly traded. The level of debt financing, given by Di, and
investor dominance (or influence) are taken to be exogenous. 7 In this model,
investor dominance is not contingent on the level or seniority of leverage. In fact,
we consider situations in which dominance arises from legal characteristics of the
financial system or the organizational structure of the firm. 8 We assume that either
shareholders or lenders have a dominant influence.
We define influence here as the capacity to determine the ex ante trans-
parency policy of a firm. This is a long-term choice that takes place before firms
receive private information, and affects the cost and incentive for ex post informa-
tion acquisition by investors.9 A firm may choose a policy of transparency either
by maintaining a broad ex ante disclosure policy, facilitating access to manage-
ment for analysts and researchers, encouraging secondary trading in the firm’s
stock, or listing on stock exchanges with stringent disclosure requirements. Given
5This specification of demand is standard and can be derived from quadratic preferences of a
representative consumer (see, e.g., Singh and Vives (1985)).
6For theoretical work on the general problem see, e.g., Maksimovic (1988), Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990), and Showalter (1995); for contrary empirical evidence see Chevalier (1995).
7In related work (Perotti and von Thadden (2001)), we endogenize both dominance and capital
structure. For the present purpose, where we analyze the implications of this structure, we can ignore
that analysis.
8The German Depotstimmrecht (delegated voting right) is an example of a non-transferable source
of voting rights that does not stem from share ownership. With this instrument, German banks vote
the shares deposited with them by their clients at a firm’s general assembly. The amount of such votes
varies, but can reach 90% (see Baums (1996)).
9This applies, e.g., to European firms deciding to list on the NYSE. Another example is the
decision to switch from the British Unlisted Securities Market to the Official List of the LSE.
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the long-term, strategic nature of the transparency decision, it is not possible to
reveal information credibly for a non-transparent firm after private information is
obtained. Of course, there will be in general an ex post incentive to reveal infor-
mation if it is good, and we assume (realistically) that there is no credible way to
communicate ex post only favorable information.
We assume that the governance rights enjoyed by the dominant investor are
neither contractible nor transferrable. Thus, financial claims cannot be rearranged
contingent on the information.
The firm’s transparency choice determines how easy it is for investors to
gather information about the firm’s quality,  i. We simplify the problem of trans-
parency and information collection in several ways to keep the problem tractable.
First, we assume that a firm can be either transparent (T) or opaque (O), and
that this choice comes at no cost. Second, concerning information collection, we
assume that each firm has (exactly) one potentially informed investor, who com-
pares the cost of information acquisition with the expected gain from informed
trading. If this investor chooses to become informed, she learns the firm’s  i;
if this investor remains uninformed, no investor knows  i.10 Third, the firm’s
transparency determines the fixed cost of learning the firm’s type for this market
investor. We assume that it costs K to learn the i of an opaque firm and zero to
learn that of a transparent firm.
This structure (which is fairly standard) implies that a transparent firm will
have informed trading of its stock if only the gains from informed trading are
positive (which they are in our model). This does not imply, however, that the
firm’s quality will always be revealed to the market. In fact, if the informed
investor manages to hide her trades behind uninformed trading, her information
will only be revealed imperfectly, if at all. Hence, in our model, transparency
facilitates information revelation but does not guarantee it.
For the stock market interaction, we employ the simplest possible market
microstructure model with profitable informed trading. 11 We assume that in each
market, in addition to the informed investor, there is a set of liquidity traders
who, as an aggregate, trade a random amount + or   with equal probability 1/2.
Prices are set by a competitive market maker at the expected future realization of
the stock value conditional on the total order flow. When setting the price in one
market, the market maker observes the price realized in the other market. 12
III. Product Market Competition
We analyze the game by solving for subgame perfect equilibria using back-
ward induction. We first examine the impact of more or less public information
on product market interaction. We then turn to the incentives for information ac-
quisition in the stock market (Section IV), given the firms’ transparency choices,
and finally (in Section V) analyze the firms’ transparency choices.
10By assuming just one potentially informed investor, we avoid the problem of information aggre-
gation, which is only tangential to our problem here.
11See, e.g., Biais, Foucault, and Hillion ((1997), ch. 3) for a discussion.
12This seems to be the more realistic assumption. Our results also hold with little change of the
analysis for the case when stock prices do not reflect new information from the competing firm’s stock.
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There can be only two outcomes concerning the public availability of infor-
mation about either firm’s : either it becomes common information—this hap-
pens when an informed investor is present and her trading reveals  completely—
or it remains private—this happens when there is no informed investor, or the
informed investor hides her trading perfectly behind liquidity trading. 13 There-
fore, we have two possible informational states for each firm: R (if its type  has
been revealed) or P (if its  is still private information). In total, this yields four
informational structures for market interaction.
A. Competition under Complete Information
We first consider competition under complete information, defined as a situ-
ation in which the information on each firm’s  is revealed (superscript RR).
We assume throughout the paper that firms produce a positive level of output,
i.e., that there is no exit. This requires assuming that demand even for a low
quality product is sufficiently strong. Formally,
L  H   L:(2)
Both firms simultaneously choose their quantities Qi to maximize profits,
taking the other’s choice as given. Hence, firm i chooses Q i as to maxQi(i Qi 
Qj)Qi:
Firm i’s behavior will depend on its own  and that of its competitor. We
therefore have four different possible states, ij = HH;HL; LH; LL, for the inter-
action. It is straightforward to calculate the unique, symmetric Nash equilibrium
(QRRHL;QRRHH;QRRLL ;QRRLH), where the superscript RR denotes the fact that both firms’
s have been revealed, and QRRij denotes a firm’s equilibrium action if it has quality
i and its competitor quality j.14
The ordering of the corresponding four profit levels is intuitive. In fact, we
have

RR
HL > 
RR
HH > B 
RR
LL > 
RR
LH;
where LH is the worst possible state for firm i and the firm makes lower profits
than in state LL, the second worst state, etc.15
The analysis of this standard form of market interaction is simple. The ef-
fect of complete information is to produce some implicit coordination on output
decisions, as each firm conditions its production on the actual strength of its com-
petitor’s demand and thus on the competitor’s ability to expand beyond its own
market.
13This last feature is due to the assumption that liquidity traders buy and sell with the same prob-
ability. If those probabilities differed, information would be revealed partially in the case of a zero
aggregate order flow.
14The derivations are contained in a technical appendix available from the authors or on the JFQA
Web site (www.jfqa.org).
15If  < 0; i.e., if the goods are strategic complements, we have RRHH > RRHL > RRLH > RRLL : in
LL, the worst possible state for firm i, it produces less than in state LH, the second worst state, etc.
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B. Competition under Symmetrically Incomplete Information
We now consider the case of competition when there is no public information
about any firm’s quality available. We shall index all variables by PP, as all the
s are private information.
Now each firm makes its output decision without knowing its competitor’s
quality j. In this case, each firm will choose output as a function only of its own
i and its expectation of the competitor’s quality  j, and therefore chooses Qi to
maximize
E
jPiQi =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
 
i   Qi   qQPPH   (1  q)QPPL
Qi
if Qi  i   QPPH
(1  q)
 
i   Qi   QPPL
Qi
if i   QPPH  Qi  i   QPPL
0
if Qi  i   QPPL ;
(3)
where QPPi denotes a firm’s equilibrium action when it has quality  i.
It is readily verified that the game again has a unique symmetric (Bayesian)
Nash equilibrium, (QPPL ;QPPH ), given in the appendix. As in the case of symmetric
complete information, it is easy to show that the profit levels in the four different
states are ordered as intuition suggests,

PP
HL > 
PP
HH > 
PP
LL > 
PP
LH :
C. Competition under Asymmetric Information
The last case to consider is the asymmetric case, in which the type of one
firm, say firm 1, is unknown to the market, whereas the other’s type is known.
Firm 1, when making its output decision, knows the state of firm 2, but firm 2
does not know 1. In this case, firm 1 will choose output as a function of  1 and
2 and therefore produce as to maxQ(1   Q  Q2(2))Q; where Q depends on
1 and 2. Firm 2, on the other hand, seeks to maximize
E
1P2Q2 =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
(2   Q2   qQ1(H ; 2)  (1  q)Q1(L; 2))Q2
if Q2  2   Q1(H ; 2)
(1  q)(2   Q2   Q1(L; 2))Q2
if 2   Q1(H ; 2)  Q2  2   Q1(L; 2)
0
if Q2  2   Q1(L; 2);
(4)
where Q2 depends on 2 and firm 2’s expectation over 1.
It is straightforward (if lengthy) to show that the game again has a unique
(Bayesian) Nash equilibrium (QRPH ;QRPL ;QRPHL;QRPHH ;QPRLL ;QPRLH), which we spell
out in the appendix. Here, QRPi is the equilibrium quantity produced by the firm
whose  is known (and which cannot condition on the other firm’s quality), and
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QPRij is the quantity produced by the firm with private information about its type
(which faces a competitor with a publicly known quality) when its own quality is
i and that of its competitor j. The corresponding eight profit levels (for each state
and each firm) are given in the appendix.
Again, it can easily be verified that equilibrium quantities and profits are
ordered as in the two equilibria under symmetric information. For example, the
profits of a transparent firm facing an opaque firm are highest when the firm has
high quality and the competitor low quality, second highest when both have high
quality, third highest when both have low quality, and lowest when the firm has
low and its competitor high quality.
To understand the costs and benefits of private information in this context, it
is useful to compare the profit levels of firm i in the case where both firms’ type
is public information (RR) with those where firm j’s type is revealed but firm
i’s is not (PR). Direct inspection shows that profits are ordered state by state.
Profits under full information, RR, are, in fact, a median-preserving spread of
profits under unilateral information, PR, in the sense that RR is statewise lower
than PR in the two unfavorable states (LL, LH) and statewise higher in the two
favorable states (HH; HL). Hence, expected profitability is always higher for the
R-firm than for the P-firm in the strong quality state, and vice versa in the weak
quality state. The same comparison holds between  PP and RP, i.e., if one firm’s
type is private information. This fact reflects a general result from the industrial
organization literature (see, e.g., Ku¨hn and Vives (1994) for an excellent survey)
and is at the heart of our argument in this paper. It is therefore useful to discuss
its underlying rationale.
The main difference in strategic interaction between the case where a firm’s
type is revealed and the case where it is not is that the R-firm’s competitor can
react more precisely to the situation on the product market, which makes the
intercept of its residual demand more volatile (Fried (1984), Li (1985)). Hence,
when in the state of high demand, a firm whose quality is public information (R)
can produce more aggressively than if it were not public, because the firm knows
that its competitor knows its strength, and will thus restrain its output. In addition,
if the competitor’s quality is not known, the R-firm does not restrain its output
when its competitor is strong, since it does not know it. The analogous argument
applies for the low quality state. Hence, having one’s own type known confers an
important strategic advantage (the advantage of forcing the other to restrain itself
when one is strong, i.e., when the gains from aggressiveness are highest), even if
the competitor’s type is private information.
Lack of information can therefore be seen as a device to prevent coordination
by competitors. This lack of coordination due to lack of information makes profits
higher on average for weaker firms and lower for stronger firms. From an ex
ante perspective, the reduced profitability in high quality states, when marginal
profitability is highest, is greater than the profit gain in low quality states. Hence,
lack of information reduces both expected profits and their variance.
We summarize our findings in the following proposition, whose proof is
completed in the appendix. We note in passing that what is important for the
analysis is the result about the variance of profits, not their mean.
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Proposition 1. Whatever the information available about the other firm, the mean
and the variance of a firm’s profits are higher when its quality is public than when
it is private information.
IV. Information and Trading in the Stock Market
A. Trading
In the last but one stage of the game (the stock market trading stage), one
investor may be informed about a firm’s  i; if so, she interacts with uninformed
liquidity traders through competitive market makers. As mentioned earlier, we
assume that all agents in the market observe the equilibrium stock price of all
firms.
Suppose first that there is an informed investor in the market for firm 1’s
stock. The market maker observes the total order flow. Given that liquidity trading
is either + or , any trading by the informed investor that is different from
leads to her information being revealed and her trading profits being zero. It is
easy to see that she maximizes trading profits by trading   (short selling) if
1 = L and + (buying) if 1 = H .
Whatever information is publicly available about firm 2, there are three pos-
sible outcomes for firm 1’s stock. The first is that liquidity traders buy and that
1 = H , which occurs with probability 1/2q. In this case, the aggregate order flow
is +2 and 1 is fully revealed. In accordance with the previous section, we de-
note the full revelation outcome by R. The second outcome, which happens with
probability 1/2(1 q), is that liquidity traders and the informed investor sell, so that
aggregate order flow is  2 and 1 again is fully revealed. In the last case, in-
formed trading just offsets liquidity trading and the aggregate order flow is 0. This
case happens with probability 1/2, and since no information about 1 is revealed, it
is denoted by P.
In each case, competitive market makers set prices such that they make ex-
pected zero profits. In doing so, they take into account the available information
about each firm’s quality (i) and the resulting competitive structure of the product
market. Define the value of equity in the different contingencies as
e
xy
ij = max


xy
ij   D; 0

; x; y 2 fP;Rg; i; j 2 fL;Hg;(5)
where D is the firm’s debt level and  xyij are the firm’s profits before debt, as
derived in the last section. Here, the firm is of quality  i, with a competitor of
quality j, and the availability of information is described by x 2 fP;Rg for the
firm and by y 2 fP;Rg for its competitor. Using this notation, the valuation of
equity is straightforward.
Suppose first that the competitor’s stock price is non-informative. Then the
share price of the firm under consideration is equal to
v(2) = qeRPHH + (1  q)eRPHL;
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if the aggregate order flow received by the market maker is 2, and therefore
reveals the firm’s quality to be H . For an aggregate order flow of 2, the market
value is
v( 2) = qeRPLH + (1  q)eRPLL ;
and if the aggregate order flow is zero, hence uninformative, the value is
v(0) = q2ePPHH + q(1  q)ePPHL + q(1  q)ePPLH + (1  q)2ePPLL :
In the first two cases, the informed investor makes zero expected profits on
her trades, because her information is fully revealed by the realized order flow. In
the last case, she makes profits at the expense of liquidity traders.
If she has good information and the aggregate order flow is uninformative,
her expected profits are
GH(0) =
 
qePPHH + (1  q)ePPHL   v(0)

:(6)
= (1  q)
 
q
 
ePPHH   e
PP
LH

+ (1  q)
 
ePPHL   e
PP
LL

;
and
GL(0) = q
 
q
 
ePPHH   e
PP
LH

+ (1  q)
 
ePPHL   e
PP
LL

;(7)
if her information is negative.
The reasoning is analogous in the case where the competitor’s stock price is
informative. If aggregate order flows are 2 or 2, the price is fully informative
and an informed trader makes no profits, whereas she makes
GHj(0) = (1  q)
 
ePRHj   e
PR
Lj

;(8)
if the aggregate order flow is uninformative, her information is good, and the com-
petitor is revealed to be of type  j; j 2 fL;Hg. Correspondingly, if her information
is bad, she makes profits of
GLj(0) = q
 
ePRHj   e
PR
Lj

:(9)
Note that the expected return from informed trading is highest when the true
state is the least likely state, as this produces a larger price correction; if q = 1/2,
the investor is indifferent between receiving good or bad news.
We can now compute the investor’s expected profit from information acqui-
sition. Consider first the case where there is no informed investor in the other
market, so that the other firm’s stock price will not be revealing. With probability
1/2, the investor in firm 1’s stock will be able to profit from her information, and
expected profits are, by using (6) and (7),
GN = 1
2
(qGH(0) + (1  q)GL(0))(10)
= q(1  q)
 
q
 
ePPHH   e
PP
LH

+ (1  q)
 
ePPHL   e
PP
LL

;
where the superscript N denotes the fact that there are no informed investors in
the other market.
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If there is an informed investor in the other market, the other firm’s stock
price will be informative with probability 1/2, so expected profits for the informed
investor in the first market are obtained by averaging over (6), (7), (8), and (9),
GI = 1
2
q(1  q)
 
q
 
ePPHH   e
PP
LH

+ (1  q)
 
ePPHL   e
PP
LL
(11)
+ q
 
ePRHH   e
PR
LH

+ (1  q)
 
ePRHL   e
PR
LL

;
where the superscript I denotes the fact that there is an informed investor in the
other market.
The following observation is trivial, but will be important for the analysis of
the impact of liquidity trading on the decisions of dominant investors.
Remark 1. The expected return from informed trading is increasing in the volume
of liquidity trading .
This is a standard result from the literature on market microstructure. How-
ever, it acquires some interesting meaning in the context of our model, in which
dominant investors may have differential preferences about the informativeness
of prices. We return to this issue in Section V.
Interestingly, the profits from informed trading as a function of what hap-
pens in the other market cannot be ordered a priori. It may be that G N < GI ,
in which case information acquisition is complementary across markets. In this
case, investing in information is more profitable if information is also acquired in
the other market than if it is not. Yet, it is also possible that GN > GI , in which
case information acquisition in the two markets is exclusionary: investing in in-
formation is more profitable if no information is acquired in the other market than
if there is information in the other market.
The difference in the attractiveness of information gathering can be reinter-
preted as the expected difference in the variation of firm profits under PR competi-
tion (which obtains if information in the other market becomes public) relative to
PP competition (which obtains if the other market is uninformative). Intuitively,
informed trading profits depend on the expected price surprise.
The relative attractiveness of information gathering in the two cases depends
on the level of debt. As a benchmark, it is useful to consider the extreme case,
when debt is riskless.
Remark 2. If debt is completely riskless in all contingencies, i.e., if e Pyij =
Py
ij  D
for all y 2 fP;Rg and i; j 2 fL;Hg, then GI = GN , i.e., the value of information
in one market is completely independent of information in the other.
The proof follows from straightforward computations using the formulae for

Py
ij in the appendix. Its intuition is that in the case of riskless debt, the aver-
age difference between high and low profits is the same whether the information
structure in the product market is PP or PR.
In the rest of this paper, we will focus on the more intuitive case of infor-
mational complementarity among markets, GI > GN . The following proposition
shows that this case prevails if debt levels are realistic in the sense that the firm
goes bankrupt in the bad state and is solvent in the good state.
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Proposition 2. Information acquisition is complementary across markets (G I >
GN), if the debt level is such that it can be repaid whenever the firm’s quality
is private information and is high, but never when the firm’s quality is private
information and low.
The condition in the proposition states that the firm’s debt level D must sat-
isfy PyLL < D < 
Py
HH for y = P;R. It does not restrict the debt level with respect
to Rx (profits when the firm’s quality is revealed), hence, it is fairly weak. Fur-
thermore, the restriction is reasonable and realistic: the firm goes bankrupt if it is
bad, and remains solvent when it is good.
If one considers the payoffs from informed trading in the two regimes (which
reflect the profit surprise under a PR vs. a PP outcome) as a function of the debt
level D, we know from Remark 2 that GI = GN if debt is riskless (D  PyLH).
Proposition 2 shows that GI > GN if debt is sufficiently large. The only case not
covered is thus the case of relatively small but risky debt ( PyLH < D < PyLL). In
this case, it is indeed possible in some cases that information acquisition is not
complementary (GI < GN).16
Proof of Proposition 2. We have
GI   GN = 1
2
q(1  q)
 
q
 
ePRHH   e
PR
LH

  q
 
ePPHH   e
PP
LH

+ (1  q)
 
ePRHL   e
PR
LL

  (1  q)
 
ePPHL   e
PP
LL

:
By assumption, we have ePyHj = 
Py
Hj   D and e
Py
Lj = 0 for all y 2 fP;Rg and j 2
fL;Hg. Hence,
GI   GN =
1
2
q(1  q)q
 

PR
HH   
PP
HH

+ (1  q)
 

PR
HL   
PP
HL

> 0;(12)
by explicit calculation.
B. Information Collection
Solving backward, we now determine the outcomes of the information acqui-
sition subgame on the stock market as a function of the firms’ ex ante transparency
policy.
As described earlier, we denote the choices by the dominant investors in
stage 1 by T (transparent) and O (opaque). Remember that information acquisi-
tion in a T-firm is costless, and in a O-firm costs K > 0. We denote the decision
to acquire information about a firm by I (become informed) or N (no information
acquisition).
Proposition 3. If K < GI ;GN , then (I; I) is the only equilibrium in the information
collection subgame for all possible T   O combinations.
This case is trivial: the transparency decision has no economic effect, be-
cause information collection is cheap in any case. In the sequel, we shall not
elaborate further on this case.
16Generalizing Proposition 2, one can show that GI > GN if the debt level is such that it can be
always repaid except in the worst state LH (LH < D < LL) and  is small enough and H   L
large enough.
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Proposition 4. If GI;GN < K, then for all possible T   O combinations, the
unique equilibrium of the information collection subgame has I if the firm is T
and N if O.
This is an economically more interesting case. A firm that chooses T can be
sure that there will be an informed investor, and a firm choosing O can be sure
that there will be no informed investor. The reason is, of course, that information
collection is so expensive that it will never happen if the firm is opaque.
A third, and most interesting, possibility is that the cost of information gath-
ering falls in the intermediate range. In this case, each firm’s share price will
reflect any information revealed about the competitor’s share price, so there is
strategic interaction between the information-gathering decisions of investors.
This gives rise to multiple equilibria.
Proposition 5. If GN < K < GI , then (I; I) is an equilibrium of the information
collection subgame for all possible T O combinations. In addition, if both firms
are opaque (O;O), then (N;N) is also an equilibrium.17
The proof of all three propositions follows from comparing the costs and
benefits of information acquisition in the four possible transparency combinations
at stage 3. To illustrate the logic, we provide here the payoff matrices for the cases
(T;O) and (O;O).
If firm 1 is transparent and firm 2 opaque (T;O), the information acquisition
game between the two potentially informed investors is given by the following
matrix
I N
I G
I
GI   K
GN
0
N 0 GN   K
0
0
To understand the payoff matrix, note that if both investors acquire infor-
mation (I; I), they both make expected returns of G I from informed trading, but
that investor 2 has to pay the information cost K associated with the investiga-
tion of an opaque firm. If only investor 1 acquires information (I;N), she makes
trading profits of GN while investor 2 in his market makes no trading profit and
incurs no information costs. Clearly, in this game, (I; I) is the only equilibrium if
GN < K < GI .
If both firms are opaque (O;O), however, the matrix looks as follows.
I N
I G
I
  K
GI   K
GN   K
0
N 0 GN   K
0
0
17There is also an equilibrium in mixed strategies, where the probability of choosing I equals
(K   GN)=(GI   GN).
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In this case, no information acquisition for both firms (N;N) is also an equi-
librium, although the informative equilibrium (I; I) Pareto-dominates the unin-
formative equilibrium. The reason for this multiplicity is the complementarity of
information production: acquiring information individually does not yield enough
trading profits to cover the information costs (GN  K < 0), whereas information
production in both markets together is profitable (G I   K > 0).
In general, I is a dominant strategy if the firm is transparent (T), whatever
the information structure realized in the other market. Corporate transparency
makes information acquisition inexpensive, and liquidity traders ensure that it is
profitable.
Unlike the case of Proposition 4, Proposition 5 reflects the intermediate case
where the transparency decision by the dominant investor has some impact on in-
formation acquisition but is not completely decisive. In particular, if both firms are
opaque, it is an equilibrium for strategic investors not to acquire information and
therefore preserve the firm’s opacity. Yet, in equilibrium both investors may also
decide to acquire information, because information acquisition is complementary
across markets: investing in information about an opaque firm is profitable if and
only if information is also acquired in the other market. In this case, investors may
coordinate on information gathering, leading potentially to complete revelation,
even when firms attempt to remain opaque.
V. Transparency Choice
In this section, we investigate the long-term choice of corporate transparency
(the first stage of the game). The two dominant investors choose simultaneously,
with the objective of maximizing the expected future value of their financial claim.
We first focus on the case GI ;GN < K presented in Proposition 4, which also of-
fers key insights for the case of intermediate information costs, which we consider
in Section V.D below. We have to distinguish between three different possible al-
locations of power in the two firms: the case where both are controlled by equity
interests, where both are controlled by debt interests, and the mixed case.
It is clear that any theory in which debt and equity have different incentives
can only apply to debt levels that are not excessive, otherwise debt would become
the residual claimant in all states. In line with the assumption in Section IV.A
that GI > GN , we therefore assume that in equilibrium equity always receives a
positive payoff if the firm is of high quality, i.e., in the states HH and HL.
Assumption A. D1;D2  xyHH for all four possible information structures xy=fRR;
RP; PR; PPg.18
A. All Equity Control
We begin by considering the case in which equity holders exert dominant
influence in both firms. Hence, in both firms, the choice of transparency is made
such as to maximize
18Clearly, this assumption is the only reasonable one: the firm does not go bankrupt in the good
state. It is, in fact, stronger than what we need for our results.
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Emax (?i (1; 2)  Di; 0) ;(13)
where E denotes the expectation over (1; 2), and ?i (1; 2) are equilibrium prof-
its in the product market, given product quality and the information available after
financial market activity (which will be influenced by the choice of transparency).
To understand the costs and benefits of transparency in this context, it is useful to
compare the profit levels before debt payments of firm i in the case where both
firms’ types are revealed (RR) with those where firm j’s type is revealed but firm
i’s is not (PR). As discussed in Section III, the comparison shows that profits
are more variable under fully revealed competition than under competition with
asymmetric information: RR is a median-preserving spread of PR; in the sense
that RR is statewise lower than PR in the unfavorable states (LL; LH) and state-
wise higher in the favorable states (HH, HL). Figure 1 summarizes the discussion
given in Section III.
FIGURE 1
Comparing RR and PR
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This observation suggests that equity, which cares about the upside of profits,
prefers the distribution RR over PR. However, investors cannot directly reveal
i; they can only influence its revelation through increased transparency. As Sec-
tion IV shows, under transparency,  i will be revealed with probability 1/2 and
remain private information with probability 1/2. If the firm is opaque, i will not
become public for sure. Comparing these two alternatives leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. If both firms are controlled by equity interests and if G I;GN < K,
then both firms are transparent in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the
game.
Proof. A transparent firm will have its quality revealed in the financial markets
with probability 1/2, whereas an opaque firm will keep its quality secret with prob-
ability 1. Therefore, if firm j is transparent, an equity-controlled firm i prefers to
be transparent if
Æ(Di)  Emax
 

RR
i (1; 2)  Di; 0

  Emax
 

PR
i (1; 2)  Di; 0
(14)
 0:
The state-by-state comparison of profit levels given in Figure 1 implies that
Æ(Di) > 0 for all Di if Æ(0) > 0: This is because the graph of Æ is (weakly) single
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peaked, which becomes clear when walking backward from  RRHL (where Æ = 0) in
Figure 2.
FIGURE 2
The Graph of Æ
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In other words, Æ is positive for all Di if only ERRi > EPRi , which has been
established in Proposition 1.
This proves that OT and TO cannot be equilibrium transparency structures.
To prove uniqueness, we have to compare the transparency structure OO with TO.
As in Figure 1, it is straightforward to compare PP and RP state by state. Again,
profits with revealed quality are a spread of profits with private information about
quality as Figure 3 shows.
FIGURE 3
Comparing RP and PP
 
                 I       I           I       I 
      π
LH
RP
   π
LL
RP
       π
HH
RP
    π
HL
RP
 
 
      I      I        I      I 
  π
LH
PP
  π
LL
PP
    π
HH
PP
  π
HL
PP
 
 
An equity-controlled firm wants to deviate from OO to TO if
(Di)  Emax
 

RP
i (1; 2

  Di; 0)  Emax
 

PP
i (1; 2)  Di; 0
(15)
> 0:
By the same argument as above, (15) holds for all D i if it holds for Di =
0: This again has been established in Proposition 1. Hence, O;O cannot be an
equilibrium.
As the proof shows, transparency is, in fact, a dominant strategy in the game
between equity holders at the first stage (taking the equilibrium strategies in the
following stages as given). The effect of complete information is to produce some
implicit coordination, as each firm conditions its production on the actual strength
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of its competitor’s demand and thus on the competitor’s incentive to expand. This
implicit coordination is so valuable that an equity-controlled firm unilaterally
prefers to become transparent.
B. All Debt Control
We now turn to the case in which lenders exert the dominant influence in
both firms. Hence, in both firms, the choice of transparency is made such as to
maximize
Emin (?i (1; 2);Di) :
Figures 1 and 3 also provide the intuition about costs and benefits of in-
formation revelation in this case. Take the situation described in Figure 3. A
lender-controlled firm that faces a non-transparent competitor has the choice be-
tween the random profits PP, if it chooses opaqueness and 1/2(PP + RP), if it
chooses transparency.19 Since the dominant interest now is to protect the down-
side of profits, lenders will prefer PP (because equity gets the upside of profits,
as in Assumption A). If their debt is risky, so that Di is above the lowest possible
profit level under RP, which is RPLH , they will strictly prefer PP. To simplify,
we focus on the case of symmetric debt levels and impose a minimum level of
leverage, to exclude the trivial case of riskless debt.
Assumption B. D1 = D2 = D > max(RPLH ; RRLH).
As Assumption A, Assumption B is consistent with (in fact, weaker than) the
assumption in Section IV.A that information collection in the two markets is com-
plementary. We can now easily characterize the behavior of dominant lenders.
Proposition 7. Suppose both firms are lender controlled, that G I ;GN < K, and
that D satisfies Assumptions A and B. Then the game has a unique subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium in which both firms are opaque.
Proof. If the competitor is transparent, firm i (strictly) prefers to be opaque if and
only if
(Di)  Emin
 
Di; PRi (1; 2)

  Emin
 
Di; RRi (1; 2)

> 0:
As in the proof of Proposition 6, it is straightforward to draw the graph of
: Noting that (RRLH) = 0 and (RRHH) > 0 by assumption, the graph has the
form shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 shows that indeed (D i) > 0 for all debt
levels permitted by Assumption A. Hence, O is the dominant lender’s unique best
response to T. A similar argument establishes that it is also for O.
Proposition 7 provides a converse to Proposition 6: whereas in the case
where all equity control firms will be transparent, dominant lenders choose to
be opaque, if debt is risky. As in the case of transparency for equity control,
opaqueness is in fact a dominant strategy for controlling lenders.
19Remember that transparency in our model does not mean that the firm’s type is revealed for sure.
Transparency just means that information acquisition in the financial market is easy, which may or
may not lead to the firm’s type being revealed.
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FIGURE 4
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C. The Mixed Case
Now we consider the case of competition between two different modes of
dominance. Assume that firm 1 is dominated by equity interests, whereas firm 2
is dominated by lender interests. Hence, firm 1’s objectives are given by (13) and
firm 2’s by (16).
Given the results of subsections A and B, the analysis is straightforward. By
Proposition 6, firm 1’s dominant strategy in the game of transparency choice is T.
By Proposition 7, firm 2’s dominant strategy is O.
Proposition 8. Suppose that firm 1 is equity controlled and firm 2 lender con-
trolled, that GI ;GN < K, and that debt levels satisfy Assumptions A and B. Then
the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium has firm 1 being transparent and firm 2
being opaque.
This situation is a combination of those in the preceding two subsections. Eq-
uity will always prefer transparency, while the lenders’ best response is opaque-
ness. The reason is as discussed following Proposition 4: information acquisi-
tion in the financial market is sufficiently expensive for an opaque firm to remain
opaque no matter what the information structure for the other firm. Hence, com-
petition across firms under two different regimes of corporate control will not
change their choice of transparency.
D. Equilibrium in the Case of Intermediate Information Costs
This last feature changes when information collection costs, K, are lower.
We now turn to this case, considered in Proposition 5, where G N < K < GI . As
we know from Proposition 5, the equilibrium continuation at stage 3 of the game
may not be unique.
In fact, by Proposition 5 (I; I) is the unique equilibrium continuation given
stage 1 choices (T; T), (T;O), and (O; T). Following (O;O), on the other hand,
(N;N) also can arise in equilibrium (as well as a mixed strategy equilibrium).
We know from the proof of Proposition 6 that equity prefers information rev-
elation (R), regardless of the situation of the competitor. Yet, we also know from
Proposition 5 that information will be acquired in both markets if only one firm is
transparent. Hence, theoretically, equilibria exist in which one equity-controlled
firm is transparent and the other opaque (and where the opaqueness does not pre-
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vent the market from becoming informed). These equilibria are asymmetric in the
sense that different controlling equity holders choose different actions, one action
(opaqueness) being chosen only because the investor knows that it has no impact
in equilibrium (due to the complementary nature of information collection). This
is artificial. Furthermore, these equilibria are not stable in the sense that if there
is the slightest doubt about whether the other firm will be transparent, an equity-
controlled firm will choose transparency at stage 1 regardless of its competitor’s
choice. In fact, doing so guarantees that investors will collect information on both
firms, thereby making it likely that information will be revealed for product mar-
ket competition. The most reasonable equilibrium in the case of all equity control
(the counterpart to Section V.A) is therefore that of both firms being transparent
also for intermediate information costs.
A similar reasoning applies in the mixed case (the counterpart of Section
V.C). Although there also exist equilibria in which both firms are opaque and
information is collected after all because the costs K are sufficiently low, the
above argument suggests that the most reasonable equilibrium is the one in which
equity-controlled firms are transparent and debt-controlled firms are opaque, but
in which information is collected in both markets. In this equilibrium (as in all
others in the mixed case), controlling debt holders will be indifferent, because
their choice has no impact on financial markets: as the competitor is transpar-
ent, the complementary nature of information acquisition will make information
acquisition profitable even in an opaque firm.20
In the case of debtor control of the two firms, the transparency choice de-
pends on anticipated investor behavior in the financial market, too. If investors
acquire information (the case (I; I) in Proposition 5), controlling debt holders
will be indifferent. However, if there is the slightest possibility that there is no
information collection for opaque firms, then only overall opacity (O;O), is an
equilibrium choice.
What is important under intermediate information costs is that debtors have
less control over the informativeness of stock prices even if they attempt to hold
the firm opaque. It is therefore possible in equilibrium to have market investors
profitably collecting information about opaque firms. Anticipating this, dominant
debtors may accept letting their firms be transparent.
E. Comparative Statics and the Impact of International Integration
Our model allows for some interesting comparative statics concerning pa-
rameters that may be interpreted to reflect international economic factors and
financial integration. In particular, these results may shed light on some recent
trends resulting from increased trading, cross-listings, and portfolio integration
20Formally, the subgame-perfect equilibria outcomes are (T; T), (T;O), and (O; T) for stage 1
(with (I; I) as the unique continuation in stage 3). Also (O;O) is a stage 1 equilibrium outcome, if the
stage 3 equilibrium continuation is (I; I). This indifference of controlling debt holders comes from
our assumption about information dissemination. In our model, we assume that information about
a firm can only be spread if financial markets are actively engaged in collecting and using it. If we
changed this assumption and called transparency the simple commitment to truthfully reveal i, then
debt-controlled firms would strictly prefer opaqueness. The reason why we choose to work with the
present model is that it gives an informational role to the market in the stock of transparent firms.
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in continental European capital markets, and by increased internationalization of
product market competition.
Relevant parameters are the extent of liquidity trading on the stock market,
, which can be seen rather naturally as increasing in the diffusion of sharehold-
ings across international investors, the costs of information acquisition, K, which
reflect at least partially technological and accounting advances, and the degree of
product market competition, .
We first start by considering the effect on transparency if market depth (in
our model the amount of noise trading, ) increases. As noted in Remark 1, the
effect is that trading profits for informed investors G I and GN will increase. Sup-
pose that the economy is initially in a situation in which these profits are smaller
than information costs K, (the case in Proposition 4 and Sections V.A–C). In
this case, banks can successfully prevent information dissemination to competi-
tors, and they can even do this unilaterally (Section V.C). If  increases until G I
exceeds K, a restrictive corporate disclosure policy may fail to restrict informa-
tiveness. In fact, because of the multiplicity of equilibria in information collection
(Proposition 5), financial market activity may become better informed and more
informative even though this is not in the interest of the dominant investors. One
is therefore tempted to argue that the large influx of international capital into Eu-
ropean financial markets since the mid 1990s, the increasing number of European
firms cross-listed in the U.S. and in London, the progressive globalization of com-
petition, and the recent shift to greater transparency of many European companies
(and some Japanese ones) are related phenomena. The effect will be reinforced
if there are external effects of information gathering (or increasing competition)
that reduce K.
Similarly, we can identify economy-wide consequences of the recent push
for shareholder value in Europe. Suppose that information costs are not too
high, and that the system is bank controlled with little information revelation.
If now there is an entry by a more transparent competitor, or one of the incumbent
firms switches to transparency because of changing shareholder pressure, there
will be a sweeping impact on the whole system. Because of the complementar-
ity in information production, informed trading will become profitable also for
the bank-controlled firms, and markets will become more informative economy-
wide. Hence, an exogenous governance change of one group of firms affects the
information dissemination for all firms in equilibrium. With opaque governance
structures now having no role to play but to impose system-wide costs (K), it is
even conceivable that this would lead to a domino effect among opaque firms in
the same industry, all adopting more transparent governance structures.
The effect of an increase in the degree of competition on the product mar-
ket depends on the form of increased competition. It is straightforward to show
from (11) and (10) that GI and GN are decreasing functions of . On the other
hand, the opening of international markets tends to increase profit opportunities.
Hence, the overall level of corporate profits and their variability, and also the gains
from exploiting superior information, may decrease or increase, with an ambigu-
ous impact on transparency. However, there are other countervailing effects of
economic integration on the evolution of transparency. First, information costs
may also be reduced by increasing competition on the product market. Possibly
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more importantly, increasing competition often manifests itself through entry of
foreign firms; to the extent that these firms may be more transparent than local
competitors would lead to increased transparency for the whole sector.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we have highlighted the impact of dominant investors on the
diffusion of information. We provide an explanation for the observation that
lender-dominated firms tend to be more opaque. Besides the low transparency
traditionally accompanying debt financing, our explanation is that the informa-
tiveness of market information may be deliberately curtailed to mitigate product
market competition. In particular, we highlight the vulnerability of this strategic
opaqueness to changes in external circumstances.
An interesting result is that the informational advantage of an opaque firm
facing a transparent competitor does not translate into an outright competitive
advantage. While lack of transparency ensures that a firm is shielded when in a
weak competitive position, when the firm is in a strong position it cannot take full
advantage of common knowledge of its strength to restrain output by competitors,
losing market share precisely when its product is relatively profitable. Hence, the
value of transparency depends on whether investors are interested in the upside or
the downside of profits.
Our notion of debtor control captures a limited, but probably important part
in the institutional setting of corporate governance systems. One qualification,
however, is that to exert control, debt holders must act in a concerted manner,
which is usually impossible if debt is widely held, and that equity must be rela-
tively weak. This is because, except in bankruptcy, equity has the formal control
rights and can, therefore, impose its preferences on debt holders (unless explic-
itly restricted by covenants). As a consequence, we have the following rough
taxonomy to anchor the classification of our theory institutionally. Equity con-
trol is present whenever equity is strong. Debt control prevails if equity is weak
and there are influential debt holders, such as a main bank. Finally, if equity and
debt are both relatively weak (e.g., widely held), we expect management to be in
control. In this latter case, it becomes crucial whether managers are interested in
the upside or downside of profits. In the earlier literature on managerial discretion
(see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), management typically prefers opaqueness.
The recent public debate over the lack of transparency and other basic corporate
governance issues in corporate America shows that this literature is still highly
topical.
In an international context, our notion of debt control is presumably more
relevant to Japanese or European than to U.S. companies, where equity or man-
agement control seems to be the norm. Thus, on average, our model predicts
higher corporate transparency in the U.S. (and perhaps the U.K.) relative to Japan
and Europe.
Some interesting applications for the evolution of corporate governance re-
sult from examining the effect of parameter changes driven by financial integra-
tion. We have shown that opaqueness may be increasingly hard to sustain as
trading liquidity rises due to rising global investment flows. More investment
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by uninformed foreign investors increases the profits to informed trading even if
the dominant investors attempt to maintain opaqueness. Greater informativeness
of prices not only tends to lead to more intense competition and greater average
profitability, but also to greater profit variability and riskiness. Greater trans-
parency may also lead to more natural selection among firms. Similar effects will
arise with foreign entry by transparent firms. On balance, we conclude that in-
creasing integration and competition may not force the convergence of corporate
governance systems (the identity of the dominant investors and their interests may
remain unchanged), but that important characteristics of corporate governance—
such as transparency and product market behavior—are likely to converge. Hence,
we expect the differences between different systems of corporate governance to
become less important.
The Appendix can be found at www.jfqa.org.
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